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“We’re Here Because
You Were There”:
Britain’s Black
Population
By
Louis Kushnick
The existence of a black population in Britain is the
result of Britain’s imperialist history. The conquest of
large parts of the world and their incorporation into a new
world system dominated by Britain and other European
nations not only created the economic basis of the
capitalist system, but also set in motion massive
movements of—and, indeed, constructions of—peoples.
The creation of the African-American and African-
Caribbean peoples are examples of this phenomenon:
“We’re here because you were there.”
The hundreds of years of the slave trade and plantation
economies involved the enforced movement of hundreds
of millions of people from established societies with their
own cultures and patterns of marriage and created new
peoples whose cultures and languages were born in the
fight against slavery and resistance to racism in all its
forms.
Asians. as well as Africans. were part of these
historical processes of migration—not as slaves, but often
as indentured laborers brought to Trinidad. Guyana, and
the Cape colony in South Afnca. Others were recruited to
work as functionaries or merchants in Britains African
colonies. In addition to the construction of new cultures
and peoples, the cultures left in place in the British
Empire were also influenced by colonial rule and its
consequences. It was from these populations, all affected
by imperialism and its supporting racist ideology, that
Britain’s black population originated.
Legislation, and the use by politicians of the
racist logic behind it, has reinforced popular
racism and militated against good race relations
by continuing to define black people as the
other, as outsiders.
There were, of course, blacks living in Britain before
the construction of this worldwide system.’ The largest
part of this population. however, owes its presence to
Britain’s recruitment of labor during the two world wars
and particularly during the post—World War II period.
Blacks were brought to Britain to fill in the gaps created
by the exigencies of war and the needs of reconstruction.
They were often brought in through the direct efforts of
certain governmental bodies: Among them were the
Ministry of Labour’s recruitment efforts in sixteen
colonies and former colonies in 1948 on behalf of the
newly created National Health Service; the efforts of
London Transport during the l950s to recruit African
Caribbeans to work in London: and the recruitment efforts
of such industry bodies as the catering industry in the
Caribbean or the foundry industry in the Indian
Subcontinent that also took place during the 1950s.
Blacks were recruited as “cheap labor”—that is.
workers who would be willing to do the worst jobs at the
lowest pay. This depended, of course, not upon any real
characteristics of blacks which made them “cheap.” which
made them willing to do the worst jobs at the worst pay.
but upon the existing popular culture of racism, which had
been inculcated and reinforced by the education system2
and by the range of institutions shaping popular culture
including theater, music hall, melodrama, and children’s
literature.3For example:
Some plays from the early nineteenth century
did display class tensions. By the end of the
century such class antagonism had disappeared
from melodrama. By then. imperial subjects
offered a perfect opportunity to externalize the
villain, who increasingly became the corrupt
rajah. the ludicrous Chinese or Japanese
nobleman, the barbarous “fuzzy-wuzzy” or
black, facing a cross-class brotherhood of
heroism, British officer and ranker together.
Thus imperialism was depicted as a great
struggle with dark and evil forces, in which
white heroes and heroines could triumph over
black barbarism, and the moral stereotyping of
melodrama was given a powerful racial twist.4
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The Creation of a State Racism
This popular racism was reinforced and relegitimated
by state racism taking the form of a series of racist
immigration laws enacted between 1962 and 1971. passed
by both Conservative and Labour governments—
bipartisanship in action—and justified on the grounds that
it was the number of blacks entering the country which
created problems and poor race relations. Such an
approach would, supposedly, create good race relations by
allaying white fears over the number of blacks
immigrating into the country. In fact, such legislation. and
the use by politicians of the racist logic behind it. has
reinforced popular racism and militated against good race
relations by continuing to define black people as the other
as outsiders. Thus, the level of racial violence in Britain
in 1993—thirty-one years after the passage of the
Commonwealth Immigration Action, twenty-eight years
after the Labour Government’s 1965 Immigration White
Paper. twenty-five years after Labour’s Kenyan Asian
Act, and twenty-two years after the Conservative’s second
piece of legislation. the 1971 Act—is higher than in
Germany where racial violence has been in the news.5
The challenge facing those in the black
community in Britain who want to fight against
state racism and the popular racism which feeds
on it is the need to reconstruct the black political
identity.
Racism appearing in many forms in all areas of
society—in the workplace. in the housing market, in the
schools, and in the criminal justice system—produced
certain consequences identified by Sivanandan: “Because
of the undifferentiated racism meted out to us in the
community and in the workplace. we came together at a
particular moment of time as blacks and not solely as
Afro-Caribbeans, Asians. and Africans. Black was the
colour of our politics, while Asian. African. etc. was the
colour of our culture.” The question now facing us is to
what extent black political identity has remained central
to Britain’s black community—or whether the cultural
identities have become central.
It is clear that political unity among communities of
color was not in the interests of the British state. In fact,
state strategies. supported by major sections of the British
media, operated to break such a unity. Asians were
portrayed in the media as being hard-working, as having
strong families and cultures as well as a clearly
differentiated class structure which could be slotted into
the existing class system. The leaders of the Asian
community. the elders, could thereby control the politics
of the masses of Asians. The African Caribbeans, on the
other hand. were not only seen as lacking the
characteristics of hard work, ambition, commitment to
education, and strong families and cultures, but, worst of
all, from the point of view of the state’s need to control
them, they had no clearly differentiated class structure.
Thus, as Lord Scarman argued in his “riot report” of 1981,
following the uprisings in Brixton and other centers of
black population:
The encouragement of black people to secure a
real stake in their own community, through
business and the professions, is in my view of
great importance if future social stability is to
be secure . . . A weakness in British society is
that there are too few people of West Indian
origin in the business, entrepreneurial, and
professional class.7
As the reality of British capitalism made expansion of
the West Indian entrepreneurial middle class unlikely, the
emphasis of state action became the creation of a
functionary stratum within the African-Caribbean
community.8Meanwhile, the characteristics once
presumed to be beneficial of a strong Asian culture and
family life eventually became a threat to British society as
a result of illegal immigration, arranged marriages, and
the refusal to integrate. The West Indians continued to be
defined in negative terms while intellectuals and decision
makers brought language and concepts from the United
States to justify these negative stereotypes: for example,
the term mugging appeared in general usage and served to
racialize street crime9—as if there had never been Street
crime before African Caribbeans appeared on the scene—
and Scarman imported Daniel Patrick Moynihan to locate
the roots of alienation and crime in the matriarchal.
broken West Indian family.
The various state strategies employed during the l970s
and 1980s. for example, hit the component parts of the
black community differently and encouraged distinct and
specific responses. The attack on African-Caribbean youth
as “muggers” focused that community’s energies in
defense of its youth. The state’s attack on the Asian
community as illegal immigrants. or the potential sponsors
of illegal immigrants. focused that community’s energies
in a series of antideportation or family reunification
campaigns. Without effective and far-sighted leadership
identifying the common roots of these attacks along with
the need for common strategies to combat racism, the
divisions that were present became more central.
In addition. there was state and media encouragement
of these differences. State funding of ethnically or
religiously defined groups was more forthcoming than for
black or racially defined groups. Careerist, petty
bourgeois individuals were encouraged to grab hold of the
variety of cooptation responses by the state to the 1980,
1981, and 1985 uprisings and to the attempts to construct
the functionary stratum of the West Indian middle class.
The media encouraged conflicts between the different
groups. privileging first one group, then another. The most
outrageous examples occurred following the September
1985 uprising in Handsworth.
After Handsworth the press took readers on a
tour of enemy territory, providing them with a
r
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“know your blacks” guide to the weird ways
of rastafarians, the intra-ethnic rivalries of the
Asian community, the hatred of black from
brown, the stark contrast between the intrinsic
lawlessness, laziness and incapacity of the
former, and the law-abiding industriousness of
the latter. Only the Guardian made room for
local testimony which emphasized that Asian
and Afro-Caribbean communities in
Handsworth were “united by poverty” and the
common experience of white racism and
police harassment. The daily press generally
was more interested in the supposed
“imported” hostilities and jealousies which
riddled the “immigrant community.” When
“racism” was mentioned at all as a
contributory cause of the “riots,” it was the
“racism” of “bitter blacks” who “hate the
Asians.” Handsworth was, accordingly, an
“uprising against Asians” by “wild,
undisciplined” West Indian youths, jealous of
their economic success.’°
In the years since the demonstrations by Muslims
against publication of Salman Rushdie’s controversial
novel, Satanic Verses, and following the Gulf War, attacks
on Islam, fundamentalism, and on Muslims themselves
have increased, with the word Muslim becoming a term of
abuse. This has reinforced what Martin Barker has called
“The New Racism”—a racism focused on the presumed
cultural differences of the outsiders which makes them
unsuitable for integration into our society.”
The media encouraged conflicts between the
different groups, privilegingfirst one group, then
another
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Conclusion
The challenge facing those in the black community in
Britain who want to fight against state racism and the
popular racism which feeds on it is the need to reconstruct
the black political identity. Such a reconstruction would
have to take account of the new forms of European racism’2
in order to develop a more inclusive identity that would
“make common cause with refugees and asylum seekers.
who are the new blacks if you like.”3 Such a black politics
would then be at the center of the struggle for social justice
and democracy for all in Britain and Europe.
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